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Reference:

7 Thompson on Real Property (1994 ed.)
ch. 57 Indian Land

Our subject is regulation of oil and gas development on Indian
lands. Three basic rules form the background. First is the con
stitutional rule governing Indian country. It's straightforward
--federal law governs. The Supreme Court derives all the govern
ing rules from treaties or acts of Congress. If there is an act
of Congress or a treaty spelling out an answer to the question,
it controls.
It has been extremely rare for an act of Congress
governing Indian country to be held unconstitutional.
The second rule is that land owned by an Indian tribe is subject
to a restraint on alienation imposed by federal law. The land
can't be sold or leased or mortgaged except as federal law per
mits. This reverses the presumption of alienability that governs
the common law of property. The rule gets confused because of
references to the trust relationship between the tribes and the
federal government. Trust law does play a role, but the form of
title doesn't matter; the land is restrained anyway.
Some individual Indians own land subject to a federal restraint
on alienation. These are called allotments, and there are many
of them on the Southern Ute Reservation. Again, sale or lease of
the land can only be done in accordance with federal law.
The third rule is the tribal sovereignty doctrine. In 1832, the
Supreme Court, in defiance of President Jackson, held that Indian
country is beyond the reach of state jurisdiction and that tribes
retain their original sovereignty except when it has been re
stricted by federal law. That rule lay around mostly unexercised
for a century or more. Tribes exercised sovereignty in Indian
Territory, now Oklahoma, but that was not within a state. There
was very little exercise on reservations within states until mod
ern times.
With the revival of tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court had to
apply the sovereignty doctrine to modern conditions. The Court

first decided that internal tribal sovereignty, over members of
the tribe, had survived. Thus states have no authority over In
dians in Indian country unless federal law expressly allows it.
Then came the question that underlies much of present legal war
fare in Indian country, that of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians in competition with state authority.
This issue reached
the modern Supreme Court with virtually no precedents. Two sim
ple answers were all and none, that is, tribes have full territo
rial authority over anyone in their boundaries, or tribes have no
authority over anyone except their members.
Justice Marshall
took the former view, but no one else. Justice Rehnquist took
the latter, and he is probably now joined by Justice Scalia and
maybe Justice Thomas.
The Court adopted the Rehnquist view for jurisdiction to punish
non-Indians for crimes.
It held that tribes lack any such au
thority unless Congress grants it. But for civil jurisdiction,
the Court's majority arrived at a middle ground that can be sum
marized by the word sometimes.
Sometimes tribes have authority
over non-Indians in their territory. And sometimes tribal
authority is exclusive of state authority. And vice versa for
state jurisdiction.
Issues about civil jurisdiction arrive in court in two contexts:
disputes about the reach of tribal authority, and disputes about
the reach of state authority. The Court answers both questions
based on an interest test. Of course, if there is a governing
act of Congress, it controls.
Otherwise, the rule is based on
the relative strength of interests of tribe, state, and feds.
Cases involving Indians and tribal land are likely to be within
tribal authority, and it is likely to be exclusive.
At the other
end, cases involving only non-Indians and non-Indian land are
likely to be within state authority, and it is likely to be ex
clusive. Obviously, a great mass of cases lie between these
poles, and cases on the margin present close questions that di
vide the Supreme Court.
In the particular context of environmental regulation of oil and
gas development on tribal lands, there are several governing
statutes and supporting regulations.
There are also issues not
clearly answered by any of them.
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I.

Introduction.
In determining the scope of tribal governmental authority to regulate conduct, one

must determine the nature of the activity to be regulated, the parties to be regulated, the
territory over which regulatory authority is to be exercised, and the relative interests of
the federal government, the state and the tribe.

Tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction

generally requires review of tribal inherent sovereign power, as well as, delegations of
power from the federal government to the tribe. Inherent sovereign power has been held
to include the power of tribal governments to regulate the activities of tribal members in
their dealings with the tribe or in activities in which the tribe has a governmental
interest.1 Further, such authority has been held to include the power to preclude or
condition the entry of non-Indians onto tribal lands or other lands over which the tribe
is recognized to maintain governmental control.2 Inherent authority has been held to not
include, however, the power to prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts for violations of
tribal criminal law.3
The federal government, while maintaining a significant supervisory presence, has
long recognized tribes as having a paramount interest in the leasing and development of
tribal energy resources.4 This interest is reflected in federal leasing statutes that require
tribal governmental consent to the development of tribal lands.5 In an historical sense,
however, the federal leasing statutes were directed more toward the obvious proprietary
interests of tribes in the revenues to be generated from tribal resources rather than to the
exercise of governmental regulatory authority to control the environmental consequences
of energy development occurring either on tribal land or on neighboring land. As the
federal government’s interest in national environmental regulation has risen to the

forefront, a recognition that tribes have a substantial governmental interest in activities
that affect the environment in "Indian country"6 has also emerged. Since 1986, Congress
has delegated to tribes specific authority

to participate as regulators with respect to

aspects of major federal statutory environmental programs. The precise scope of tribal
civil regulatory authority under such programs or under concepts of inherent sovereignty,
particularly as that authority relates to state environmental regulatory authority, remains
an area for fertile dialogue in the classroom, the courts, and the halls of Congress. In
order to understand the positions of the various parties involved in that dialogue, one
needs to review the fundamentals of Indian law and the development of federal
environmental programs in conjunction with states and tribes.

I.

Relationship of States and Tribes in Indian Country.
Tension between states, tribes and the federal government about regulatory

authority in Indian country has existed since the formative years of the United States.
The United States Constitution delegates to Congress the authority to regulate commerce
"with the Indian Tribes."7 That constitutional authority, coupled with federal recognition
of the mutual obligations between tribes and the nation contained in treaties with tribes,
resulted in the time-honored tenet that the federal government, rather than states,
possesses plenary authority over Indian affairs.8 Indian tribes were viewed as distinct
political communities9 with the status of "domestic dependent nations" existing under the
protection of the federal government.10 Under alternative theories of federal preemption
and unauthorized infringement upon retained sovereignty, states were prevented from
engaging in regulatory activity over Indians or their lands which unduly encroached upon
the competing interests of the federal government or tribes.11
The exercise of preemptive federal authority over Indian affairs has in many
instances been accompanied by a territorial component, Indian country, which for
purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction includes, among other things, all lands within the
exterior boundaries of a federally recognized Indian reservation.12 The Indian country
concept codified in the federal criminal code has also been utilized by courts as the area
within which tribes generally possess freedom to conduct their own affairs and to exercise
certain governmental powers to the exclusion of the state, so long as not inconsistent with
2

federal law or policy.13 Application of these basic concepts to particular circumstances,
however, is challenging, particularly when the activity at issue involves non-Indians. For
example, in the case of Montana v. United States.14 the Supreme Court

considered

whether the Crow Tribe could lawfully prohibit non-Indians from hunting or fishing on
non-Indian fee owned property within its reservation. Finding that such exercise of tribal
authority bore "no clear relationship to tribal self-government," the Court rejected the
Crow Tribe’s prohibition.15 In so ruling, however, the Court set forth the following
guideline for evaluating tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation
ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.16
More recently, in the case of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation,17 the Court rejected the position of the tribe and accepted the position of
the county in holding that the county, rather than the tribe, had the power to regulate
zoning on non-Indian fee owned property within the reservation. A plurality of the Court
distinguished the circumstances from those in which the federal government had delegated
such authority to tribes under environmental regulatory statutes.18 In the absence of such
delegations, the authority of tribes to regulate non-Indians on fee land may now require
a determination that the activity poses a "demonstrably serious" threat to the political
integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.19 Where the activity
being undertaken occurs on tribal land within a reservation, however, the validity of tribal
civil regulatory jurisdiction will be rejected only if such governmental action is
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes. Because tribes are recognized to possess
the power to condition entry upon tribal land, it is difficult to imagine instances in which
3

the exercise of civil regulatory jurisdiction over tribal land would not be upheld in the
absence of either federal preemption or the lack of a rational justification of

the

regulatory action. The concurrent exercise of state regulatory power is not automatically
precluded because tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians is upheld.20

If the

exercise of state regulatory authority does not adversely impact the policies of the tribe
or the federal government, it is possible that state regulatory power over non-Indians may
also be valid.

ID.

Federal Environmental Regulatory Programs; Delegations to States and
Tribes.
As first enacted, federal environmental laws generally required the Environmental

Protection Agency to establish standards for limiting the continued discharge of
pollutants, to create permits systems for enforcement of the standards, and to delegate to
states so desiring the primary enforcement authority for such programs under standards
no less rigorous than those established by the EPA. Even prior to statutory amendments
addressing tribal jurisdiction, courts had upheld EPA decisions to withhold from state
delegations the power to regulate activities on Indian reservations.21 These decisions
were premised on the assumption that states could not demonstrate jurisdictional authority
to regulate all activities within reservation boundaries.

Such decisions were also

consistent with decisions in other contexts that precluded federal agencies from delegating
to states the trust responsibility over tribal land resource development.22
Commencing in 1986, Congress amended several major environmental statutes to permit
tribes to be treated as states for certain purposes under those enactments.

Tribal

delegation amendments authorized EPA to delegate primacy to tribes with respect to
control of public water systems and underground injection under the Safe Drinking Water
Act.23 Amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act in 1986 also permitted tribes to participate in aspects of the Superfund
program.24 In 1987, Congress amended the Clean W ater Act to allow tribal primacy
under various programs, including development of water quality standards,

issuing

permits for nonpoint source discharge, and enforcement of tribal standards.25 Amend
ments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 expanded upon previously existing provisions
4

permitting tribes to redesignate their reservations for air quality standard purposes and
authorized tribal treatment as a state under various programs under that statute.26
Implementation of the tribal delegation amendments, particularly on reservations
that have a checkerboard land ownership pattern, has not been without controversy.27
One of the key guiding principles of EPA in making delegations regarding reservation
lands has been assurance that delegee tribes possess regulatory jurisdiction over all lands
within reservation boundaries. Indeed, Congress has conditioned program delegation in
some instances upon an adequate demonstration by an applying tribe that it possesses the
jurisdiction to carry out the regulatory functions sought.28 In conducting this review,
EPA has not considered the delegation amendments themselves as conferring additional
tribal jurisdiction, but rather has looked to jurisdictional authority prior to the particular
amendments as the relevant period for analysis. In this way, EPA has attempted to avoid
a patchwork of conflicting state and tribal standards or enforcement mechanisms which
would turn on land ownership patterns. For those familiar with the Southern Ute Indian
Reservation, because of

the three dimensional checkerboarding of ownerships, and

because of specific legislative measures affecting jurisdiction, it is arguable that neither
the State of Colorado nor the Southern Ute Indian Tribe will be able to demonstrate such
jurisdiction over all persons on all lands within the boundaries of the reservation to the
satisfaction of EPA.

IV. Public Law 98-290.
The Southern Ute Indian Reservation consists of approximately 700,000 acres in
southwestern Colorado. Initially established in 1868, the reservation changed dramatically
in size in response to vagaries in federal Indian policy.

Between 1895 and 1899,

reservation lands were allotted to individual Indians, and the balance of the reservation,
"surplus lands," was then opened to trust administered cash entry under the homesteading
laws. In response to questions about reservation boundary location, Congress, in 1984,
enacted Public Law 98-290, which confirmed the exterior boundaries of the reservation.
That legislation was a compromise supported by the Tribe, the State and local
governments, in which the Tribe, while continuing to possess Indian country jurisdiction
over Indians throughout the reservation, relinquished Indian country territorial jurisdiction
5

over non-Indians conducting activities on non-Indian land.

This jurisdictional act

preceded the tribal delegation amendments, which arguably restored jurisdictional
authority reservation-wide for environmental programs. The existence of this legislation
poses unique problems for EPA in determining whether or not to grant delegations to the
Tribe under the environmental tribal delegation amendments. In the absence of complete
jurisdiction by the tribe, however, it appears clear that delegations of primacy to the State
would be improper because of the retained Indian country jurisdiction of the tribe over
its own conduct and that of its members throughout the reservation.

V. Conclusion.
The absence of resolution of environmental jurisdictional issues within the
reservation has created confusion, not only for the would-be regulators, but also for those
individuals who must comply with environmental laws. The Air Quality Division for the
State of Colorado has apparently issued demands for reports from operators of
compression and processing facilities located on fee lands within the reservation that treat
coalbed methane and natural gas derived from tribal lands. The Air Quality Division has
also indicated its intent to inspect such facilities for compliance with State air quality
standards established under EPA Clean Air Act delegations that do not include lands
within the reservation. This circumstance demonstrates the difficulty for operators in
determining to whom they should answer from a regulatory standpoint. Ultimately, either
special legislative resolution or some cooperative agreement blessed by EPA that includes
joint participation between the Tribe and the State may be necessary to break the
perceived impasse in progress in delegations.

tomNenvhotop.docM 0/95
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I. Introduction.
Over the last two decades, the Federal Government has become more and more
committed to a policy of strengthening and supporting Indian sovereignty. Accordingly,
jurisdiction over numerous matters affecting "Indian lands" has, slowly but surely, been placed
by Congress with the Tribes. This transition has been particularly noticeable in the mineral
resource development area. The Indian Mineral Development Act of 19821was enacted with the
express purpose of enabling the Tribes to exercise more control over the development of their
mineral resources. Further, Congress continues to authorize certain agencies of the Federal
Government to delegate to the Tribes specific enforcement and regulatory authority.2
As this trend of Indian self determination continues to expand, particularly in the
environmental arena, there will be more and more occasion for jurisdictional conflict between
individual States and the Tribes that reside within them.
II. Survey of Federal Indian Environmental Rights and Jurisdiction.
A. CERCLA.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") authorizes the Tribes to be treated "substantially the same" as States for
certain purposes.3 The Tribes have a right to notification of release of hazardous
substances, a right to be consulted with respect to formulation of remedial action, and a
right to access to information concerning hazardous substances maintained by operators
of facilities, among others. The Tribes do not have the right of initiation, development,
and selection of remedial actions to be undertaken on the reservation; rights that are
provided to individual States under CERCLA.

>25 U.S.C.A. §2101
2
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A § 1377 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 7601
(1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A § 300h-l (1988).
3 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

B. Clean Water Act.
In recent years, Congress has increased the Tribes' control over water quality issues.
Amendments to the Clean Water Act have authorized the Environmental Protection
Agency to delegate to a qualifying tribe regulatory authority, comparable to that granted
to the States, to grant NPDES discharge permits for dredging and filling under CWA §
404 and to set water quality standards under CWA § 303.4
C. Clean Air Act.
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act gave a sweeping authorization to the EPA
administrator to treat Tribes as States whenever Tribes are capable o f carrying out air
quality functions, including permitting "in a manner consistent with the terms and
purposes of the Act."5
D. EPA Indian Policy.
Following Congress' various authorizations to delegate to Indian Tribes certain
enforcement and regulatory authority, the EPA developed an "Indian Policy", the
expressed purpose of which is to expand tribal involvement in EPA program
implementation. The EPA Indian Policy requires that the EPA or Tribes, rather than the
States, should implement federal environmental statutes on Indian lands, and that where
authorized, the EPA will cooperate with and assist Tribes in developing and
implementation tribal programs under Federal environmental statutes.
III. States Role in Environmental Matters on Indian Lands.
A. Indian Lands.
A key determinant in assessing a States ability to exercise jurisdiction over Indian lands
in the environmental arena is how Indian lands is defined. If lands are not considered
Indian lands then the State will have jurisdiction. Unfortunately, there is not a clear cut
answer as to what constitutes Indian lands and what does not. There is general agreement
that land within a formally established reservation, in which the Tribe owns the surface
and the mineral rights, is clearly Indian lands. However, there are other fact situations in

4 33 U.S.C.A § 1377 (1988); See 58 Fed. Reg. 67966-67985 (Dec. 22, 1993), adopting
final rule implementing CWA tribal program regulations.
5 42 U.S.C.A § 7601 (D)(2)(1988 and Supp.II 1990).
-
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-

which the characterization of the land as Indian land may be disputed. For example, what
if the Tribe owns the surface and a non-Indian owns the minerals, or vice versa? Further,
what about land that was originally non-Indian fee land that has since been acquired by
the Tribe? Does the answer change if the lands are inside or outside a delineated
reservation? What about "checkerboard" pattern land ownership characteristic of the
Southern Ute Reservation?
The United States Supreme Court discussed the "checkerboard" situation in the context of
Tribal zoning authority in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Rands of Yakima Indian
Nation. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). In Brendale. the Court, relying on their holding in Montana
v. United States 450 U.S. 544 (1981 )6 determined that any regulatory power the Tribe
might have under their applicable treaty "cannot apply to lands [within reservation
boundaries] held in fee by non-Indians." In so holding the Court also acknowledged that
although the Allotment Act had been repudiated in the Indian Reorganization A c t, 48
Stat. 984, it did not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of and control over those lands
that had already passed to non-Indians or prevent already allocated lands for which fee
patents were subsequently issued from thereafter passing to non-Indians.

B. State Authority on Indian Lands.
Generally speaking, State power over activities on Indian lands is very limited. States
may exercise power conferred by express federal delegation or when, under a balancing
analysis, State regulatory interests are strong and federal or tribal interest are
comparatively weak.7 This balancing test results in a highly subjective analysis and
determining what constitutes a sufficiently strong state interest is an uncertain and often
frustrating task. The State of Colorado has delegated to the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission ("COGCC"), regulation of oil and gas operations, including
regulation of certain drilling, permitting, and spacing issues.8 The applicable statute does
not expressly state an intention to include Indian lands within the jurisdiction of the

6 In analyzing the effect of the Indian General Allotment Act, on a Tribes's treaty rights
to regulate activities of non-members on fee land, the Montana Court concluded that "[i]t defies
common sense to suppose Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands
would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was
the ultimate destruction of tribe government."
7 See Slade and Stern, Environmental Regulations on Indian Lands: A Question o f
Jurisdiction, The Compleat Lawyer, Fall 1995, for a more detailed discussion of state and federal
environmental regulatory authority on Indian lands.
8 C.R.S. 34-60-106(1995).
-
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COGCC9, and, to date, the COGCC has not tried to directly assert such jurisdiction. It is
conceivable, however, that the interests set forth in the State Legislative Declaration for
the COGCC might be considered sufficiently strong to warrant an assertion of
jurisdiction in a particular circumstance.10
Certain Memorandum of Understanding exist between the Colorado Bureau o f Land
Management and the COGCC, and between certain Tribes and the BLM. These MOUs
purport to give the COGCC authority to conduct hearings, review certain matters, and
make decisions affecting Indian lands. However, the authority granted to the COGCC is
not only limited by the language of the MOU itself, but also by constraints on the
delegative authority of the federal government. In reviewing the justiciability o f a case
concerning a Tribe's claim that a certain cooperative agreement (very similar to the
MOUs referenced above) constituted an impermissible delegation of authority by the
BLM, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that "if the Tribes
could prove that the Cooperative Agreement has resulted in BLM approval of State Board
orders without meaningful independent review, then its procedures would constitute an
unlawful delegation o f authority."11
IV. Conclusion.
To date, the COGCC and the Tribes have chosen to work cooperatively in regulating oil
and gas activities and, as a result, jurisdictional controversies have been kept to a
minimum. If such controversies do arise, however, two primary interrelated questions
would need to be answered: "Are the lands affected 'Indian land'?" and "What are the
respective regulatory interests of the State and the Tribe?"

9
C.R.S. 34-60-105 (1) states, in relevant part, that "[t]he commission has jurisdicti
over all persons and property, public and private, necessary to enforce the provisions o f this
article", but whether Indian lands and Tribes are to be included in "public and private" is left
open.
10 C.R.S. 34-60-102 (1) provides in part th a t"[i]t is declared to be in the public interest to
foster, encourage, and promote the development, production and utilization o f the natural
resources o f oil and gas in the state of Colorado in a manner consistent with the protection o f
public health, safety, and welfare; to protect the public and private interests against the evils of
waste in the production and utilization of oil and gas by prohibiting waste; to safeguard, protect
and enforce the coequal and correlative rights of owners and producers in a common source or
pool o f oil and gas to the end that each such owner and producer may obtain a just and equitable
share therefrom."
11 Assinibione Tribe v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation o f Montana, 792 F.2d 782
(1986).
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